

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-12 ADP-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09

H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01

SS-15 USIA-12 NEA-10 GAC-01 TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01

ACDA-19 RSR-01 NIC-01 /140 W
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P R 191536 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4613

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USMISSION BERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BONN 5799

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, WB, GE, GW, UR, UN

SUBJECT: BKC/ L ON EXTENSION OF UN CHARTER TO WEST BERLIN

REF: A. STATE 69573; B. BONN 5407; C. BONN 5304

SUMMARY: AT BONN GROUP MEETING ON APRIL 18, FONOFF REP (BRAEUTIGAM) MADE CLEAR THAT DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WERE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN DETERMINING FRG WISH TO HAVE SOVIETS INFORMED IN NEAR FUTURE ABOUT THE BKC/ L ON EXTENSION OF THE UN CHARTER TO WEST BERLIN. POINTING OUT THAT THERE CONTINUED TO BE KEEN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT OF BERLIN' S REPRESENTATION AMONG OPPOSITION POLITICIANS, BRAEUTIGAM SAID THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WISHED TO HAVE ANY POTENTIAL SOVIET OBJECTIONS OUT IN THE OPEN AND DEALT WITH BEFORE MAY 11, WHEN THE CHANCELLOR WOULD PROBABLY COMMENT ON THE SUBJECT DURING FINAL BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON THE BASIC TREATY AND UN ENTRY LEGISLATION. THE UK AND FRENCH REPS SAID THEY COULD
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ACCOMMODATE FRG DESIRES TO HAVE THE TEXT CONVEYED TO THE SOVIETS RELATIVELY SOON. DRAWING ON REF A, THE US REP SAID US CONTINUED TO DOUBT THE WISDOM OF BRINGING THE BKC/ L TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SOVIETS TOO SOON, BUT SAID THAT IN LIGHT OF FRG POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO HIS AUTHORITIES A COMPROMISE PROCEDURE DESCRIBED BELOW. END SUMMARY.

1. BRAEUTIGAM RECALLED THAT DURING DISCUSSIONS IN BUNDESTAG COMMITTEES, THE CHANCELLOR HAD PROCEDURES DEvised TO PROVIDE FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN (SEE BONN 5053). HE HAD ALSO PROMISED TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT BEFORE THE BUNDESTAG AND WOULD PROBABLY MAKE A GENERALLY WORDED REMARK DURING FINAL CONSIDERATION OF UN LEGISLATION ON MAY 11 INDICATING THAT AUTHORIZATION TO REPRESENT BERLIN HAD BEEN GIVEN. AT THIS TIME THE CHANCELLOR WISHED TO BE ABLE TO SAY IN GOOD FAITH THAT NO DIFFICULTIES WERE EXPECTED FROM THE SOVIETS ON REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN. THE FONOFF FEELING WAS, THEREFORE, THAT IT WOULD BE OF GREAT ADVANTAGE TO HAVE POSSIBLE COMPLAINTS FROM THE SOVIETS OUT IN THE OPEN AND HOPEFULLY DEALT WITH BEFORE MAY 11 TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF CONTRADICTION OF THE CHANCELLOR' S STATEMENT AT A LATER DATE, WITH A RESULTING DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTROVERSY IN THE FRG.

2. BRAEUTIGAM SAID THE FONOFF SAW A FURTHER ADVANTAGE TO CONVEYING THE TEXT TO THE SOVIETS EARLIER RATHER THAN LATER. IF THE THREE POWERS KEPT THE SOVIETS INFORMED AS THE PROCESS OF UN ENTRY DEVELOPED, THE USSR WOULD BE PUT IN THE POSITION OF EITHER HAVING TO RESPOND TO THE ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY OR OF BEING IN A TACTICALLY WEAKER POSITION TO DO SO LATER. BRAEUTIGAM ARGUED THAT IF THE SOVIETS ALLOWED ISSUANCE OF THE BKC/ L AND TRANSMISSION OF THE LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO GO UNCHALLENGED, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO CLAIM THE RIGHT TO OPPOSE FRG REPRESENTATION OF WEST BERLIN AT A LATER DATE.

3. BRAEUTIGAM ARGUED THAT THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD BE IN A MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TACTICAL POSITION IF POSSIBLE SOVIET OBJECTIONS COME OUT EARLIER RATHER THAN LATER.
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IF ANY SOVIET COMPLAINTS WERE DELAYED UNTIL SECURITY

COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THE FRG AND GDR APPLICATIONS
HAD BEGUN, OR EVEN UNTIL AFTER MEMBERSHIP HAD BEEN
APPROVED, THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD HAVE LITTLE LEVERAGE
TO USE IN COUNTERACTING SOVIET EFFORTS. HOWEVER, IF
SOVIET OPPOSITION RECURRED BEFORE SECURITY COUNCIL
CONSIDERATION HAD BEGUN, THE WEST COULD THREATEN TO
DELAY THE ENTIRE UN MEMBERSHIP PROCESS UNTIL THE
DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN CLEARED UP.

4. BRAEUTIGAM SAID THAT IN LIGHT OF THE HIGH POLITICAL
INTEREST ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AT THE
MOMENT, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
WOULD DELAY SUBMISSION OF ITS APPLICATION UNTIL ANY
PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE SOVIETS OVER REPRESENTATION OF
BERLIN HAD BEEN SOLVED. HE RECALLED THAT THE CHANCELLOR
HAD VIRTUALLY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO SUCH A POLICY IN
COMMITTEE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION WHEN HE HAD AGREED WITH
THE CDU THAT EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN WOULD
BE A PRECONDITION FOR FRG MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN (PARA 2,
BONN 5053). BRAEUTIGAM SAID THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS
OF THE VIEW THAT A THREAT OF DELAY WOULD CAUSE THE
SOVIETS TO PULL BACK, SINCE ACHIEVING U
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SS-15 USIA-12 NEA-10 GAC-01 TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01

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P R 191536 Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4614
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION BERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BONN 5799

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, WB, GE, GW, UR, UN

SUBJECT: BKC/ L ON EXTENSION OF UN CHARTER TO WEST BERLIN

5. THE FRENCH REP SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES AGREED WITH THIS VIEW AND THAT HE COULD APPROVE SHOWING THE TEXT TO THE SOVIETS AT THE EARLIEST CONVENIENT DATE. THE UK REP (CROMARTIE) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WERE MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE PROPRIETY OF GOING TO THE SOVIETS AT THIS TIME, BUT IN LIGHT OF HIGH FRG POLITICAL INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT, THEY COULD AGREE TO A SLIGHT COMPROMISE TO THE FRG PROPOSAL. CROMARTIE SAID HIS AUTHORITIES DID NOT WANT TO CONTACT THE SOVIETS IMMEDIATELY FOR TWO REASON: (A) TO SHOW THEM THE BKC/ L NOW MIGHT INDICATE THAT WE WERE IN EFFECT RESPONDING TO THE SOVIET REPLY TO OUR NOTE ON EXTENSION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO BERLIN. RECALLING THAT THE ORIGINAL SOVIET NOTE HAD MADE PARTICULAR MENTION OF THE UN LEGISLATION, CROMARTIE SAID TO PRESENT THEM WITH THE BKC/ L NOW MIGHT

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CAUSE THE SOVIETS TO FEEL OBLIGED TO RESPOND; AND (B) THE UK FELT THAT THE ENTIRE SCENARIO FOR UN ENTRY SHOULD RECEIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION BEFORE IT WAS DECIDED WHEN TO APPROACH THE SOVIETS. IN THE UK VIEW, THIS MEANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DELAY OF A WEEK OR TWO BEFORE THE BKC/ L TEXT WAS PASSED TO THE SOVIETS. CROMARTIE THOUGHT THAT THE FIRST WEEK OF MAY WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

6. THE US REP SAID HE CONTINUED TO HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF APPROACHING THE SOVIETS TOO EARLY ON THIS QUESTION. HE NOTED THE DEPT' S VIEW THAT IF THE SOVIETS WERE GOING TO OBJECT TO FRG REPRESENTATION OF WEST BERLIN THEY WOULD PROBABLY NOT REACT TO ISSUANCE OF AN ALLIED ORDER BUT WOULD SAVE THEIR COMMENTS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION. HE STRESSED AGAIN THE US VIEW THAT A POSSIBLE RESULT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIETS TO CLAIM THE RIGHT TO BE CONSULTED ON OTHER PHASES OF THE UN SCENARIO. AT THE SAME TIME, THE US REP SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WERE BEHIND THE FRG POSITION AND THOUGHT HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD AGREE TO AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE DOMESTIC GERMAN POLITICAL SITUATION. THE US REP THOUGHT THAT THE UK PROPOSAL TO DELAY THE APPROACH UNTIL EARLY MAY MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, IF IT COULD BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BEING

GIVEN THE TEXT ONLY AS A MATTER OF COURTESY AND THAT NO CONSULTATION WAS BEING OFFERED.

7. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MANNER OF PRESENTATION WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN HEADING OFF ANY SOVIET REQUEST FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION. BRAEUTIGAM EXPRESSED HESITATION WITH MAKING THE APPROACH IN NEW YORK, SINCE THIS MIGHT SUGGEST DIRECTLY TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE BERLIN ISSUE WAS BEING CONCLUDED IN A GENERAL CONSULTATION ON THE UN MEMBERSHIP QUESTION AND THAT THEIR VIEWS WERE BEING SOLICITED. THE US REP NOTED THAT RAISING THE SUBJECT AT THE POLAD LEVEL MIGHT HAVE THE SAME RESULT, ESPECIALLY SINCE BELETSKIY HAD IN RECENT MONTHS SEEMED ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN DEMONSTRAT-
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ING HIS COMPETENCE FOR WEST BERLIN AFFAIRS. THE UK REP THOUGHT THE BEST WAY ROUND THESE PROBLEMS WOULD BE TO HAVE THE CHAIRMAN PROTOCOL OFFICER SIMPLY LEAVE A TEXT WITH HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART, NOTING ONLY THAT HE WAS DOING SO AS A MATTER OF INFORMATION. IT WAS AGREED TO RECOMMEND THIS ALTERNATIVE TO AUTHORITIES.

8. EMBASSY COMMENT: THERE IS CLEARLY A GOOD DEAL OF SENSITIVITY ON THE PART OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED IN CARRYING OUT THE UN MEMBERSHIP PROCESS IF THE SOVIETS RAISED DIFFICULTIES OVER REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN. CDU CHAIRMAN BARZEL UNDERLINED HIS INTEREST IN THE ISSUE BY MAKING PROMINENT MENTION OF IT DURING A TELEVISED INTERVIEW FROM WASHINGTON WHICH WAS CARRIED ON THE GERMAN EVENING NEWS ON APRIL 18. THE GOVERNMENT PROBABLY IS WORRIED THAT FURTHER DIFFICULTIES HERE, WHEN COUPLED WITH CONTINUING GDR INTRANSIGENCE IN IMPLEMENTING CERTAIN COMMITMENTS FLOWING FROM THE BASIC TREATY COULD CAUSE DIFFICULT POLITICAL PROBLEMS DURING THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF THE UN ENTRY PROCESS.

9. WE CONTINUE TO AGREE WITH THE DEPT THAT INFORMING THE SOVIETS OF THE TEXT OF THE BKC/L WILL NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THEY WILL NOT REACT ON THE BERLIN REPRESENTATION QUESTION AT A LATER DATE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT GIVING THE SOVIETS SOME ADVANCE NOTICE WOULD PUT THE CHANCELLOR ON FIRMER POLITICAL GROUND. THE PROCEDURE PROPOSED BY THE BONN GROUP FOR DEPOSITING A COPY WITH THE SOVIET PROTOCOL OFFICER IN EARLY MAY WOULD BE THE BEST WAY OF INDICATING TO THE SOVIETS THAT NO CONSULTATION WAS BEING OFFERED. IF THEY DEMANDED FURTHER CONTACT, WE COULD MAKE A GOOD CASE THAT OUR METHOD OF HANDLING THE AFFAIR HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE TEXT WAS BEING GIVEN ONLY AS A MATTER OF COURTE-

SY. WE ALSO THINK THAT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF VALIDITY
IN BRAEUTIGAM' S OTHER ARGUMENT THAT WE WILL BE MORE ABLE
TO DEAL WITH SOVIET COMPLAINTS BEFORE ACTION HAS BEEN
TAKEN ON THE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS.

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-12 ADP-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09

H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01

SS-15 USIA-12 NEA-10 GAC-01 TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01

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P R 191536 Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4615
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION BERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BONN 5799

10. CONCERNING USBER' S PROPOSALS FOR INSERTING THE
BKC/ L IN SOME WAY INTO THE UN APPLICATION PROCESS, THERE
WAS AGREEMENT AT THE BONN GROUP MEETING ON APRIL 18 THAT
IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE TO ATTACH A COPY OF THE BKC/ L TO
THE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION. ALLIED AND FRG REPS ARGUED
THAT TO DO SO WOULD CREATE A PRECEDENT WHICH COULD BE TO
OUR DISADVANTAGE IN FUTURE YEARS. WITH REGARD TO USBER' S
SUGGESTION THAT SPECIAL MENTION BE MADE TO THE BKC/ L
WHEN THE FRG APPLICATION IS SUBMITTED (BERLIN 657) IT
WOULD BE RECALLED THAT THE SCHEEL LETTER AS NOW DRAFTED
ESTABLISHES A CLEAR CONNECTION BETWEEN THE MEMBERSHIP
PROCESS AND REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN IN ITS VERY FIRST
WORDS. IN ADDITION, THE LETTER REFERS DIRECTLY TO THE
" AUTHORIZATION GIVEN BY THE ALLIED KOMMANDATURA" AND
INCLUDES SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE BKC/ L. SINCE THIS

LETTER WILL BE CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT,
WE BELIEVE THAT THE BASIC POINT USBER HAS IN MIND WILL
BE SUFFICIENTLY COVERED.

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11. DEPT' S GUIDANCE REQUESTED. HILLENBRAND

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts:
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 APR 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973BONN05799
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730448/aaaaiujf.tel
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Office: ACTION EUR
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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Reference: A.STATE 69573, B.BONN 5407, C.BONN 5304
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06 AUG 2001
Review Event:
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TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, GE, UN, UR
To: BERLIN
EUR
LONDON
MOSCOW
NATO BRUSSELS
PARIS
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USUN NEW YORK

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